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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 930303-CA
Priority No. 2

JERRI SUE TEUSCHER,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The

following

statutes,

rules

and

constitutional

provisions are set forth in full in Addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
U.S.

Rules of Evidence, Rule 4 03
Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b)
Const, art. I, § 12
Const, amend. V
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence

of other bad acts under Rule 404(b)?
Standard of review -- CORRECTNESS.
Because the admission of evidence under Rule 4 04(b) is a
question "of law, it is viewed for correctness. However,
the trial court's subsidiary factual determinations
should be given deference by the appellate court and only
be overruled when they are clearly erroneous." State v.
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991) (citation
omitted); see also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270
n. 11 (Utah 1993) (recognizing bifurcated standard when
appeals court reviews underlying factual findings). When
reviewing a trial court's balancing of the probativeness
of a piece of evidence against its potential for unfair
prejudice under Rule 403, we reverse only if the court's
decision as a matter of law "was beyond the limits of
reasonability."
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240
(Utah 1992).

State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d

694, 698-9

(Utah App. 1993).

Broad

discretion is given to the trial court's determination to admit or
exclude evidence under Rule 403.

State v. Pena, No. 930101, slip

op. at 8 (Utah February 15, 1993).
2.

If

the

other

bad

act

evidence

was

properly

admissible under Rule 404 (b), whether the trial court erred in its
determination that the probativeness of the evidence outweighed its
potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403?
Standard of Review.
3.

See standard for issue 1.

Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's

motion to suppress statements made without benefit of a Miranda
warning?
Standard of review.

Where the underlying facts are not

in dispute, an appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusion
as

to whether

the

individual was

in custody

State v. Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 18
State v.

Mirquet,

844

P.2d

995,

997

for correctness.

(Utah 1993); see also

(Utah App.

1992).

Any

underlying factual findings will not be set aside unless they are
clearly erroneous.

Wood, 22 9 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18; People v.

Russo, 196 Cal. Rptr. 466, 468 (Cal.App. 1983).
4.

Whether the trial court erred in failing at any

recess in the proceedings to admonish the jury not to form an
opinion?
Standard of review.

This is a question of statutory

interpretation reviewed for correctness. In re Estate of Anderson,
821 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991).
2

5.

Whether prosecutorial misconduct requires that Ms.

Teuscher be granted a new trial?
Standard of review.
When objections are not made at trial and properly
preserved, appellate review is under a "plain error"
standard. Plain errors are those that "should have been
obvious to the trial court and that affect the
substantial rights of the accused."
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992)

(quoting

State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Utah App. 1991) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On December 16, 1991, Richard Oscar Christensen1 went
into respiratory and cardiac arrest while at Ms. Teuscher's home
day care.

Ms. Teuscher phoned 911, but efforts at resuscitation

were unable to restore unaided life functions.
after

termination

of

life

support

Rocky died shortly

on December

17, 1991.

By

information dated March 6, 1992, appellant Jerri Sue Teuscher was
charged with depraved indifference murder, a 1st degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (c) (Supp. 1993) . R. 7-9.

325-444.

Pretrial motions were heard on December 29, 1992.

R.

A jury trial was held on February 8-18, 1993.

See

transcripts, R. 445-2269 (ten volumes, with a separate volume for
closing arguments).

The jury returned a guilty verdict

lesser included offense, manslaughter, a 2nd degree
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205

(1990).

for a

felony, in

R. 284.

Ms.

Teuscher was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years at

^ o m September 23, 1991, "Rocky" was approximately 2M months
old at the time of his death.
3

the Utah State Prison, together with full restitution.2

R. 2327;

3 07 (Judgment, Sentence, Commitment).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State filed a motion in limine to allow presentation
of

evidence

of

other

bad

acts.

R.

25-40

(motion);

41-61

(memorandum); 76-9 (supplement); 82-7 (defendant's memorandum in
opposition).

The trial court granted significant portions of the

State's motion.

R. 185-91 at 186-90.

The State mentioned Ms. Teuscher's prior bad acts in
opening statements.

R. 615-6 (vl.175-6).

The State's prior bad

acts evidence was presented in its case-in-chief.

See discussion

and record cites infra at Point I, p. 7.
Dr. Michael Dean, the treating physician for Rocky's
arrest, found no retinal hemorrhages. R. 819 (v2.122).
Folberg, an ophthalmologist

and pathologist

from

Dr. Robert

Iowa, R.

958

(v3.2), who examined Rocky's eyes at the request of the medical
examiner,

R.

977-8

(v3.22-3),

testified

concerning

hemorrhages and abnormalities found in Rocky's eyes.
(v3.24-32) .

various
R. 979-87

"The interesting thing about this case, the things we

see most frequently in shaken baby [syndrome] are not seen in this
case."

R. 988

(v3.33).

Dr. Folberg had never seen a similar

collection of injuries in any patient before. R. 990 (v3.35) . Dr.
Folberg testified that it is unlikely that CPR could have caused
this constellation of injuries.

2

R. 1001 (v3.46).

As yet undetermined as to amount.
4

The autopsy revealed no trauma around Rocky 7 s eyes.
1642-3

(v6.25-6)

(Dr. Maureen Frikke, M.E.).

Dr. Frikke found

injuries around Rocky's brain stem and spinal chord.
(v5.170-1).

R.

R. 1591-2

The injuries were atypical for shaken baby syndrome.

R. 16 02 (v5.182) . Dr. Frikke had seen three children with somewhat
similar injuries.

R. 1603

(v5.183).

Dr. Frikke testified the

injuries were consistent with holding the infant by the head and
shaking the body back and forth or side to side. R. 1611 (v5.191) .
She opined it was highly unlikely the injuries could be the result
of a fall into a playpen.

R. 1613 (v5.193) . The medical examiner

admitted that it was possible that there was "some other mechanism
of injury" responsible for Rocky's injuries and death.
(v6.30-31).

R. 1647-8

The M.E. could not rule out accident as the possible

cause of death.

R. 1654 (v6.37).

The medical examiner found the

manner of death to be undetermined.

The final paragraph of the

autopsy report reads: "Blunt force injuries were not present in
Richard.

From post mortem findings, it could not be ascertained

whether the injuries occurred as a result of a deliberate act or
whether

the

injuries

accident[al] act."

occurred

as

a

result

of

a

careless

or

R. 1653 (v6.36).

Dr. Marion Walker, a member of the child protection team
at Primary Children's Hospital, testified that the injuries found
in Rocky were consistent with shaking while held by the head, R.
1728

(v7.69), and that Rocky went into arrest immediately upon

sustaining his injury.

R. 1730 (v7.71).

Dr. Walker unequivocally

ruled out accident as a possible cause of Rocky's injuries.
5

R.

1733

(v7.74).

Dr. Walker ruled out the possibility that a four

year old could have been responsible.

R. 1734-5 (v7.75-6).

Dr. William Palmer, director of the child protection team
at

Primary

Children's

Hospital,

significance of changing stories.

testified

concerning

the

R. 1836 (v8.44), 1861 (v8.69).

Dr. Palmer also concurred that the most likely mechanism of injury
was shaking by the head.

R. 1847 (v8.55).

Dr. Palmer testified

that cardiac arrest would have occurred within minutes after the
shaking event.

R. 1848 (v8.56).

Dr. Palmer testified concerning

a study involving 422 children who fell from heights of less than
five

feet,

injuries.

and

none

of

R. 1854 (v8.62).

results here were unique.

those

cases

resulted

in

significant

Dr. Palmer confirmed that the autopsy
R. 1866 (v8.74), 1879 (v8.87).

Ms. Teuscher denied shaking Rocky.

R. 2063

(v9.134),

2074 (V9.145), 2123A (v9.195).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The prior bad acts evidence admitted by the trial court
should have been excluded under Rule 4 04 (b) .

Intent is not an

element of depraved indifference homicide, and lack of accident and
identity were not seriously disputed.
upon accusation
introduction

Similar defenses presented

are not a proper basis for State argument

of prior

bad

act

evidence.

The prior

bad

or

acts

evidence had very little or no probative value.
Under Rule 403, the prior bad act evidence should have
been excluded as more unfairly prejudicial than probative.

Prior

bad act evidence was weak, the acts were dissimilar and remote,
6

there was no need for the evidence as other evidence was more than
adequate, and the prejudice was extreme.
Statements of Ms. Teuscher taken by the police without
benefit of Miranda warnings should have been suppressed.

These

statements were used to support the State's improper arguments
concerning
Austin

the changing

Marston

cardiopulmonary

broken
arrest

stories and cover-ups
leg

incident

incident,

and

and

involved

the Rocky

greatly

in the

Christensen

prejudiced

Ms.

Teuscher.
The trial court failed to admonish the jury to keep an
open mind and not form opinions at recesses.

The length of this

trial exacerbated this omission. The jury formed improper opinions
long before Ms. Teuscher had any opportunity to present her case,
in violation of her right to a fair trial.
The
instances.
Teuscher.

prosecution

committed

This misconduct

misconduct

in

was plain and prejudicial

several
to Ms.

She should be granted a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS UNDER
RULE 4 04(b).
The trial court granted the State's motion to elicit the

following evidence:
a.
defendant,

Testimony from Jody Merrill, daughter of the
concerning

(1)

an

incident

where

the

defendant allegedly picked up a baby by the arm and threw

7

the baby across the room onto a bed;3

(2) an incident

where the defendant allegedly shook an older boy by the
shoulders when he couldn't

find his backpack;4

having children in closets and storage rooms;5

(3)

and (4)

Ms. Teuscher's statements concerning Austin Marston's
broken leg.6
b.

Testimony from various individuals concerning

a November 19, 1990 incident in which five month old
Austin Marston allegedly sustained a broken leg while in
Ms. Teuscher' s care.7
c.
picking

Testimony

by neighbor

Bentley Wilson

about

a 3-4 year old child up under the arms and

shaking him.8
d.

Testimony by neighbor Brenda Wilson

(wife of

Bentley) concerning pulling a child to her by the hair,
and yanking him over a railing by one arm.9
3
4

Elicited at trial at R. 1374-5 (v4.230-1).

Elicited at trial at R. 1373-4 (v4.229-30).

5

Elicited at trial at R. 1375-6 (v4.231-2).

6

Elicited at trial at R. 1377 (v4.233).

7

Elicited at trial at R. 615 (vl.175)(prosecutor's opening
statement), 1127-8 (v3.173-4), 1236-48(v4.91-103 (father, Dave
Marston), 1306-39 (v4.161-194)(investigating detective, Charles
Trost), 1342-1342A (v4.197-8) (client parent Cyndie Howard), 1377
(v4.233) (daughter Jody Merrill re: statements made by Ms.
Teuscher),
8

Elicited
(v4.264-5).
9

at

trial

at

R.

1394-1403

(v4.251-60),

Elicited at trial at R. 1408-1423 (v4.265-80).
8

1407-8

e.

Testimony concerning children being placed in

closets.10
R. 185-91 at 186-90.
In State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court outlined the purpose and operation of Rule 4 04(b):
The general rule prohibiting evidence that a
defendant committed other crimes was established, not
because that evidence is logically irrelevant, but
because it tends to skew or corrupt the accuracy of the
fact-finding process.
. . . Thus, evidence of other
crimes is generally inadmissible unless it tends to have
a special relevance to a controverted issue and is
introduced for a purpose other than to show the
defendant's predisposition to criminality.
State v.
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).
Even if evidence of other crimes is probative
of a particular element of a crime and is not offered
merely to show criminal predisposition, such evidence is
not automatically admissible under Rule 404(b).
10 J.
Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice, § 404.21 [2]
(2d ed. 1988). Its tendency to lead the finder of fact
to an improper basis for decision must still be balanced
against its probative value and the need for such
evidence in proving a particular issue.
E. Cleary,
McCormick on Evidence, § 190, at 565 (3d ed. 1984)
suggests the factors to be evaluated in the balancing
process:
The problem is not merely one of pigeonholing,
but of classifying and then balancing. In deciding
whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like
substantially outweighs the incremental probative
value, a variety of matters must be considered,
including the strength of the evidence as to the
commission of the other crime, the similarities
between the crimes, the interval of time that has
elapsed between the crimes, the need for the
evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and

10

Elicited at trial at R. 1375-6 (v4.231-2) (daughter Jody
Merrill), 1460 (v5.38) (detective Jill Candland), 1553-1564
(v5.132-143) (church counselor Nora Cook), 2019-25 (v9.90-96)
(defendant, countering evidence presented by the State), 2115-7
(v9.186-8) (cross of defendant). The State refers to this evidence
in closing argument at R. 2174 (closing.13) and 2255-8 (closing.9699) .
9

the degree to which the evidence probably
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.

will

Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295; accord State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d
424, 426 (Utah 1989); O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701.
"We

have

recognized,

however,

and

must

continue

to

recognize, that the various categories of exceptions -- intent,
design or plan, identity, etc. -- are not magic passwords whose
mere incantation will open wide the courtroom doors to whatever
evidence may be offered in their names." United States v. Goodwin,
492 F.2d

1141, 1155

admitted

only

if

(5th Cir. 1974) .

the

evidence

has

a

"Such evidence may

be

very

of

high

degree

probativeness with respect to a particular element of the crime
charged and will not otherwise result in undue prejudice."

State

v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 1989).
A.

THE OTHER BAD ACTS EVIDENCE HERE IS NOT
PROBATIVE OF ANY MATERIAL ISSUE OTHER
THAN CHARACTER.

The State asserted that the prior bad acts evidence it
introduced was relevant to identity, lack of accident or mistake,
and intent.
below,

the

See State's memorandum, R. 41-60.xl
evidence

adduced

by

the

State

was

As detailed
not

properly

admissible for any of these purposes.

i:L

Although the State initially purports to assert "absence of
accident, intent, knowledge, opportunity, motive, and common scheme
or plan," R. 42, a careful reading of the memorandum indicates that
only absence of accident, intent, and identity are seriously
argued. The trial court's order (R. 185-92 at 187-9), as prepared
by the State, makes clear that the ruling is based on only these
three grounds. See also R. 332 (State's oral argument on motion;
"identity . . . the absence of accident and intent are the three
primary theories the State is arguing at this point.").
10

Shickles requires that prior bad acts evidence must have
a "special relevance to a controverted issue."
accord, Featherson, 781 P. 2d at 426.
be

capable

of

being

"pigeonholed"

760 P.2d at 295;

Even though the evidence mayinto

one

of

the

4 04(b)

exceptions, admissibility does not necessarily follow.12

The court

must undertake an analysis of whether the particular

issue is

genuinely disputed.
In

Shickles,

contested issues."

"intent

and

760 P. 2d at 296.

mental

state

were

hotly

The question presented was

whether defendant took the victim to Denver with implied permission
from her parents, or whether she was taken for improper purposes.
The Supreme Court permitted evidence of sexual misconduct that
occurred in Denver because it was probative of whether the victim
was taken for improper purposes.
The Featherson court criticized admission of evidence of
other

bad

acts

because

the

State's

purpose

for

offering

the

evidence, identity, was not disputed. The Supreme Court quoted at
length from People v. Tassell, 679 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1984) :
As noted at the outset, this case presented no
issue of identity.
No rational argument would
support a contention that the three sets of sex
crimes were part of one larger plan. There being no
issue of identity, it is immaterial whether the
modus operandi of the charged crime was similar to
that of the uncharged offenses. While the People
rely on the 'common plan or scheme' rationale for
admissibility, under the circumstances that is
merely a euphemism for 'disposition.'
(Footnotes omitted.) Similarly, since identity was not
an issue in this case and the apparently uncharged
12

0f course, Rule 4 03 analysis is an ever-present basis for
exclusion in appropriate cases. See Point II, infra at 26.
11

misconduct in 1977 and 1978 (nine and ten years ago)
cannot be viewed, along with the instant charges, to be
part of one large plan, it was error to admit the
uncharged incidents.
Featherson, 781 P. 2d at 429. The Featherson court ultimately found
the error harmless, however.
The State bears the burden of showing that the evidence
it seeks to elicit has some special relevance to a material issue
in the case.
Cir.

United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1373 (10th

1989); United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th

Cir. 1982) .

"There must be a clear and logical connection between

the

earlier offense

alleged

tried."

or misconduct

and

the case

being

United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1317-8 (10th Cir.

1983) .
1.

Intent was not an issue at all, much
less a disputed issue in this case.

Ms. Teuscher's intent was not at issue, and the prior bad
acts evidence should not have been admitted for that purpose.
State

charged

homicide.

Ms.

R. 7-9.

Teuscher

only

with

depraved

The

indifference

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (Supp. 1993),

provides:
76-5-203. Murder.
(1)Criminal homicide
actor:

constitutes

murder

if

the

(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life
engages in conduct which creates a grave
risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another;
In State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984), the Utah
Supreme Court definitively determined the mens rea
12

requirement for

depraved indifference homicide. The State must prove both that the
defendant had knowledge that his or her conduct created a grave
risk of death to another, and the jury must determine whether the
conduct

evidenced

"reasonable

depraved

person"

indifference

standard,

rather

by using

than

using

an
a

objective
subjective

standard looking at the defendant's actual State of mind.
1047.

Id. at

The defendant's subjective intent is irrelevant.13
State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843

(Utah 1992) conclusively

establishes that intent is not an element of depraved indifference
homicide.

Accord State v. Haston, 846 P. 2d 1276 (Utah 1993) . The

issue in Vigil was whether Utah recognized the crime of attempted
depraved indifference homicide.

The attempt statute, Utah Code

Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990), provides that a person is liable if "acting
with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission
of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial
step toward commission of the offense."

Subsection (2) provides

that "conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is
strongly
offense."
does not

corroborative

of

the

actor's

intent

to

commit

the

The Supreme Court found depraved indifference homicide
include

an element

of

intent, and thus no crime of

attempted depraved indifference homicide exists in Utah.
Since depraved indifference homicide does not involve any
element of intent, the State had no need here to prove intent, by

13

Even the State recognized this. In closing, the prosecutor
stated "[w]e're not contending, and she's not charged, with
intending to kill Rocky Christensen." R. 2185 (closing.25).
13

means of prior bad acts or otherwise.14
724,

726

(Ala.Cr.App.

exclusionary

rule

1990)

prohibiting

("The
the

Reeves v. State, 570 So. 2d
intent

exception

admission

of

[to the

evidence

of

collateral crimes to prove the guilt of the accused] is simply not
applicable in a case that requires no specific criminal intent

as

a prerequisite to conviction.") ; Pounds v. United States, 529 A. 2d
791,

795 n.6

(D.C.App. 1987) (exceptions only applicable

when

affirmative defenses put state of mind in issue or when intent is
material issue; "because specific intent is irrelevant for incest,
carnal knowledge, or rape of a minor, appellant's state of mind was
not at issue") . The prior bad acts evidence in this case was thus
not admissible to prove intent, because intent was not an element
of the crime charged.

See Wareham, 772 P. 2d at 963 ("evidence may

be adduced 'to establish any of the constitutive elements of the
crime . . . ' ") .15
14

0f course, where the charged crime requires a showing of
specific intent, intent is at issue even absent any dispute by
defendant. E.g. , United States v. Harrod, 856 F.2d 996, 1000-01
(7th Cir. 1988).
15

Even if intent were an element of the offense, it was not at
issue here. Ms. Teuscher adamantly denied ever shaking any infant.
R. 2027 (V9.98), 2063 (v9.134), 2074 (v9.145), 2097 (v9.168), 2123A
(v9.195). This is not a case where the act is admitted, and the
relevant question for the jury is the actor's state of mind at the
time the offense was committed. The question here is whether Ms.
Teuscher committed the act.
If she did, intent follows as a
necessary incident. See, e.g., United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d
1001, 1007 (6th Cir. 1975) ("Here, on the contrary, if the act were
proven, intent would naturally be inferred from the mailing of the
threatening letters."); People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 299, 61
N.E. 286, 296 (1901) ("Could proof of any number of repetitions of
this act add anything to the conclusive inference of criminal
intent which proof of the act itself affords? Can it be possible
that in the face of such irrefragable indicia
of murderous intent
it is still necessary or proper to prove the commission of other
14

In Utah, prior bad acts to show intent have only been
admitted when intent was actually at issue. See Shickles, 760 P. 2d
at 296 (intent and mental state "hotly contested issues"); State v.
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah App. 1990) ("Defendant directly
challenged the element of intent. He claimed he was only trying to
collect a debt through somewhat insistent, but not unlawful means.
Defendant was being tried for aggravated robbery . . .

The only

two controverted elements of the charge were the use of a weapon
and

defendant's

intent.");

O'Neil,

848

P.2d

at

700-701

(defendant's claim of innocent presence during drug sale properly
rebutted by prior convictions for drug distribution as they show
knowledge and intent).
In United States v. Jenkins, 7 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1993),
defendant was charged with distributing LSD.

In rebuttal,16 the

prosecution elicited evidence that the defendant had previously

similar crimes to establish intent? These questions carry their
own answers."); McGee v. State 725 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex.App. 1987)
("The State introduced circumstantial evidence of the extraneous
offense even though appellant's intent could be inferred from the
act itself."); Baldonado v. State, 745 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex.App.
1988) ("Extraneous offenses are admissible to prove scienter, where
intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of the State's
case and cannot be inferred from the act itself.");
Johnson v.
State, 544 N.E.2d 164, 169 (Ind.App. 1989) (intent was necessary
incident of battery and abduction);
People v. MacDonald, 542
N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (A.D. 1989) ("While one of the recognized exception
to the general rule permits the admission of uncharged crime
evidence to show intent, such evidence will often be unnecessary,
and therefore should be precluded even though marginally relevant,
where intent may be easily inferred from the commission of the act
itself. ") .
16

Where, as here, the State introduces prior bad acts in its
case in chief, the prejudice to the defendant is even greater.
15

engaged in the sale of marijuana.

The Eighth Circuit reversed,

finding that defendant's absolute denial of participation in the
charged crime meant intent was not at issue.

The only relevance of

the evidence was therefore the impermissible propensity inference,
and the evidence should have been excluded as improper character
evidence.

Id. at 807.
In United States v. Fierson, 419 F.2d 1020

(7th Cir.

1969), defendant was charged with impersonating an FBI agent and
attempting

to commandeer an automobile.

The State

introduced

evidence concerning a prior occasion when the defendant demanded an
automobile under the guise of being an FBI agent.

The Seventh

Circuit reversed, and stated:
Obviously intent must be an element of the offense to
justify the admission of this type of evidence. Prior
criminal acts cannot be proved to show intent when intent
is not an element of the offense charged. . . .
However, to justify admission into evidence of
an accused's prior criminal acts to establish willfulness
and intent, it is necessary that willfulness amd intent
be more than merely formal issues in the sense that the
defendant is entitled to an instruction thereon. When,
as in this case, the government has ample evidence to
take the case to the trier of fact for its deliberation,
a plea of not guilty cannot, by itself, be construed as
raising such a keen dispute on the issue of willfulness
and intent so as to justify admission of this type of
evidence.
Id. at 1022-3 (cites omitted).

See also Thompson v. United States,

546

1988)

A.2d

414, 422

(D.C.App.

("When a

defendant

denies

participation in the conduct which is alleged to constitute the
crime, intent is ordinarily not a material issue for purposes of
admitting

other

crimes

evidence.";

"where

intent

is

not

controverted in any meaningful sense, evidence of other crimes to
16

prove intent is so prejudicial per

se that it is inadmissible as a

matter of law").
Numerous

other

cases

from

other

jurisdictions

also

recognize that intent must be at issue before prior bad acts may be
introduced on that basis.

See, e.g., State v. Beasley, 809 F.2d

1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1987) (intent at issue where chemist charged
with obtaining controlled substance for distribution testified that
the drugs were acquired for legitimate research on vegetables; but
case affirmed in part and reversed in part due to prejudicial prior
bad acts evidence);
922-3

United States v. San Martin, 505 F.2d 918,

(5th Cir. 1974) (materiality of issue is one part of four

part test);

Hamilton v. United States, 409 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir.

1969) (fl[W]here the prior offense bears sufficient similarity to
the one under inquiry and is not too remote in point of time, it is
admissible as evidence on the issue of the intent with which an act

was done where intent
offense

charged."

inadmissible

since

, as such, is a critical
[emphasis
there

in

could

be

ingredient

original] ;
no

prior

question

defendant in fact sold moonshine as charged);

of

of

the

offense

motive

if

United States v.

Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1152 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Although intent was
an element of the crimes charged [conspiracy to import marijuana],
that issue was never seriously disputed at trial.");

United States

v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001, 1007 (6th Cir. 1975) (" [W]e conclude the
admission of the challenged evidence was erroneous for the more
fundamental
issue.");

reason

that

intent

was

a genuinely

contested

United States v. Cochran, 546 F.2d 27, 30

(5th Cir.

17

not

1977) ("Defendant claimed that he had no such intent so that the
question of defendant's general intent of state of mind at the time
that the firearms were purchased was clearly put

in issue.");

State v. DeCicco, 435 F.2d 478, 484 (2nd 1970) (Art theft; "[The
informant]'s

story,

if

believed,

leads

ineluctably

to

the

conclusion that the defendants knew what they were doing, for had
any of the defendants admitted the facts testified to by

[the

informant] any claim that they were ignorant of the nature of the
goods or their intended destination for sale to a prospective buyer
would be patently incredible.");
820 F.2d

1232, 1237

United States v. Soundingsides,

(10th Cir. 1987)

(intent not at issue in

beating death where no specific intent needed to be proven, and
intent could be inferred from the act itself);

McGee v. State, 725

S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex.App. 1987) ("Evidence of an extraneous offense
is admissible to help prove intent only if the intent required for
a conviction for the primary offense is a contested issue in the
case.");

Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 115

(Fla. 1989)

("The

record discloses that McKnight's state of mind was never in issue.
Therefore,

testimony

irrelevant.");

to

establish

his

mental

Landrum v. United States, 559 A.2d

state

was

1323, 1326

(D.C.App. 1989) ("intent must be a genuinely contested matter in
the case and not merely a formal issue") ; Ford v. State, 514 So. 2d
1057, 1059

(Ala.Cr.App. 1987)

apply, it is necessary

("In

order for the exceptions to

, however, that the accused's intent be

contested at trial.");

18

The San Martin court noted the inappropriateness of using
prior bad acts to show intent for crimes involving intent of the
moment:
[T]he evidence of prior crimes involving intent of the
moment are hardly ever probative of later acts involving
similar split-second intent. Indeed, such prior crimes
have less to do with the type of specific intent that
may arise later, as in fraud, than they do with the
defendant's overall disposition or character; and if
there is one clear category that is not an exception to
the general rule against allowing evidence of prior acts,
it is that which includes "character, disposition, and
reputation."
San Martin, 505 F.2d at 923 (quoting Michelson v. United States,
335 U.S. 469, 475, 69 S. Ct. 213,

, 93 L.Ed. 168,

(1948)).

Intent was not at issue, and prior bad acts evidence should not
have been admitted on that basis.
2.

Lack of accident or mistake was not
at issue in this case.

The State's theory of how Rocky's injuries occurred rules
out the possibility of accident or mistake.

The State asserted

that Rocky was held by the head, and his body was shaken or swung
back and forth, causing a "dislocation" in Rocky's neck resulting
in a cessation of cardiac and pulmonary function.

See R. 1847

(v8.55) (Dr. Palmer); 1728 (v7.69) (Dr. Walker); 1611 (v5.191) (Dr.
Frikke).

Dr. Walker unequivocally ruled out accident as a possible

cause of Rocky's injuries, R. 1733 (v7.74), as did Dr. Palmer.

R.

1861 (v8.69).
Lack of accident or mistake was not at issue here.
Teuscher denied ever shaking Rocky Christensen.
2074

(v9.145), 2123A (v9.195).

Ms.

R. 2063 (v9.134),

The prior bad acts evidence was
19

admitted in the State's case in chief.

At that time, the defense

had presented no evidence concerning accident.

When the defense

presented

its case, it still presented no evidence

accident.

Houston v. State, 531 So.2d 598 (Miss. 1988) is similar

in many ways.
charges

that

Houston was a capital homicide
the

defendant

killed

her

case

daughter.

concerning

involving
The

State

introduced evidence of abuse of the daughter by her mother over the
course of eight years.

The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the

conviction and death sentence.

The trial court admitted the prior

abuse evidence solely on the issue of intent, as it related to
ruling

out

the possibility

of accident.

The appellate

court

reasoned:
[T] he evidence of prior abuse may be received "to negate
the idea that the injuries were the result of a fall or
other isolated incident." Here the word "negate" is the
key. It suggests that the evidence is relevant if there
has in some manner been a prior effort by the defendant
to convince the court and jury that the child's injuries
were the result of a fall or other isolated accident.
Here they find nothing of the sort. At the time the
prior abuse evidence was received, Houston had offered no
evidence whatsoever. In fact, Houston never offered any
evidence at the guilt phase of the trial, much less
evidence attempting to show that the injuries Paula had
received on June 3, 1985, were the result of a fall or
isolated accident.
Perhaps if defense counsel had
indicated in opening statement that Houston would attempt
to prove such "isolated accident," we might have a
different matter, but such is not the case here as
defense counsel made no opening statement.
The only thing before the Court which might
conceivably be taken as forming the predicate is
Houston's confession.
But Houston did not put this
confession in evidence, Indeed, she objected to it. The
prosecution may not build up a strawman and then knock it
down. The prosecution cannot place Houston's confession
before the jury and then claim this has sufficed to lay
the predicate for evidence of eight years of prior abuse
which is not logically relevant to the charge in the
indictment.
20

. . . If intent is the issue upon which the
prior abuse evidence is relevant, it follows that the
prior abuse evidence must reflect an intent to abuse -an intent of the same felonious nature as is involved in
the present prosecution. But this begs the question, for
nothing in the prior abuse evidence reflects upon intent.
Nothing offered shows any pattern of behavior, differing
from the spontaneous loss-of-control, fly-off-the-handle
theory of Houston's confession -- only that the same
thing may have happened on a number of occasions over the
years.
Houston, 531 So. 2d at 606-7.

The State has done the same here.

Teuscher denied shaking Rocky.
him, but it was an accident."
only

to knock

Ms

At no time did she say "I shook
The State has set up its strawman,

it down with extremely prejudicial

evidence

of

unrelated, dissimilar, irrelevant instances of conduct that serve
only to impugn appellant's character.
In Harvey v. State, 604 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1979) , the trial
court allowed evidence of prior abuse to a child to show malice and
intent.
issue

The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, finding the central

in

the

case

to be

causation

rather

than

intent.

The

defendant admitted spanking the victim, but denied any blows to the
head.

The court further found that no defense of accident or

mistake was raised, and the evidence was thus inadmissible for that
purpose. Reversing, the court emphasized the prejudicial nature of
this type of evidence:
Evidence of past abusive conduct is often available in
child abuse cases and strictly speaking is never totally
irrelevant.
However, its relevance often exists only
because it reflects on the propensity of a past offender
to continue a pattern of child abuse. This is precisely
the type of inference Rule 404(b) is intended to prevent.
For this reason, evidence of past incidents of child
abuse is generally held to be more prejudicial than
probative.
21

Id. at 590. The question here was whether Ms. Teuscher shook Rocky
Christensen, causing the injuries that led to his death.
shaking could not have been accidental.

Such

Lack of accident was not

at issue.
3.

Identity was not at issue in this
case.

The identity exception in Rule 404(b) is different in
kind than the other exceptions.

As one court has noted:

The identity exception has a much more limited
scope; it is used either in conjunction with some other
basis for admissibility or synonymously with
modus
operandi.
A prior or subsequent crime or other incident
is not admissible for this purpose merely because it is
similar, but only if it bears such a high degree of
similarity as to mark it as the handiwork of the accused.
Goodwin, 492 F.2d at 1154

(footnote omitted) .

This court has

formulated the inquiry as whether the defendant's acts are "so
unique as to constitute a signature."

State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 6

(Utah App. 1990) (quoting Younablood v. Sullivan, 52 Or.App. 173,
628 P. 2d 400, 402 (1981) . None of the bad acts evidence introduced
by the State comes even close to meeting this standard.

The only

similarities between the acts are that they involve appellant and
her conduct towards children.

No uniqueness is present.

The only possible question with respect to identity was
whether perhaps one of Ms. Teuscher's daughters might have been
responsible for Rocky's injuries.

The only other non-children in

the home were Ms. Teuscher's high school age daughters.
undisputed that they did not touch Rocky.

It was

R. 881 (v2.184) (Amy

Teuscher denies touching Rocky or seeing anyone else touch him);
993 (v2.236) (Kathy Teuscher denies touching Rocky or seeing anyone
22

else touch him) . Ms. Teuscher was the only other possibility.

She

likewise testified that her daughters did not touch Rocky.

R.

2086-7 (v9.157-8).
Austin Marston's broken leg was the only prior bad act
evidence

concerning

Teuscher's care.

any

type

of

injury

to a child

under Ms.

To the extent there may have been some question

concerning the Teuscher daughters' involvement in the injury to
Rocky, the Marston incident could have had some limited probative
value in showing that Ms. Teuscher was responsible.

Significantly,

the State did not rule out the possibility that Amy or Kathy
Teuscher may have been responsible for Austin Marston's broken leg.
Cf. R. 1314 (v4.169) (testimony from investigating officer Trost
that one of Ms Teuscher's daughters may have dropped the child).
Detective Trost never interviewed Ms. Teuscher's daughters.
1330-1 (v4.185-6).

R.

The State closed its investigation and listed

the cause of injury as accidental.

R. 1333-4 (v4.188-9).

The State did not prove that any wrongdoing occurred, or
who may have been responsible.

Absent a showing that Ms. Teuscher

was responsible and that wrongdoing occurred, evidence concerning
Austin Marston's broken leg had no probative value
probative value at best).

(or limited

That was the conclusion of the police,

and nothing was offered to indicate why that conclusion may have
been incorrect.
Identity was not at issue here.
clarified

nothing,

and

served

no purpose

23

The Marston incident
save

to

impugn Ms.

Teuscher's character.
this evidence.

This is, of course, an improper purpose for

Rule 404(b).

Other bad act

evidence

offered by

the State

has

no

relation to identity at all. For example, the testimony concerning
children in closets may indicate that Ms. Teuscher put children in
closets on some occasions and therefore is more likely to have done
so on other occasions.

However, this says nothing about who, if

anyone, may have been responsible for killing Rocky Christensen.
At best, this is pure propensity/disposition/character

evidence

proscribed by Rule 404(b).
Admitting prior bad acts to show identity when identity
is not in issue is reversible error.

Cox, 787 P. 2d at 6.

This

case has nothing in common with the only Utah case where prior bad
act evidence was allowed to show identity.
748

P.2d

1069,

problematic.

1074-5

(Utah

1987),

In State v. Johnson,

identity

evidence

was

The only eyewitness was only "70% certain" of the

identification

made.

Testimony

from

a different

store

clerk

concerning a similar check passing incident was thus necessary for
purposes of identification, and properly admitted.

Here, there is

no such question of identity, and the prior bad acts evidence
should have been excluded.
Cases

from

other

jurisdictions

are

in

accord

that

identity must be in dispute before prior bad acts may be introduced
for that purpose.
(5th Cir.
identity

1976)
was

See United States v. Park, 525 F.2d 1279, 1284
("there is no

a material

indication

issue"; reversed
24

in the

record

on 404(b)

that

grounds);

United States v. Maestas, 554 F.2d 834, 837 (8th Cir. 1976)

("In

the absence of any eyewitness identification, identity was very
much in issue."), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 972, 97 S.Ct. 2936, 53
L.Ed.2d 1070 (1977);

Bowden v. State, 538 So.2d 1226, 1239 (Ala.

1988) (consolidated case; in one case where identity was in issue,
prior bad acts were properly admissible for that purpose; in other
case where identity not in issue, prior bad acts evidence could not
come in) ; McGee, 725 S.W.2d at 365 (issue of identity is raised by
alibi defense);
1989)

Johnson v. State, 544 N.E.2d 164, 169 (Ind.App.

(identity not at

issue where assailant

and victim

were

acquainted for eight years).
4.

Similarity
in
Ms.
Teuscher's
responses to accusations is not a
proper basis for admission of prior
bad acts evidence.

The State specifically offered the Marston broken leg
evidence in part to show similarity in Ms. Teuscher's response to
accusations.

See R. 54-6 (State's memo on motion in limine):

The entire scenario surrounding the broken leg suffered
by Austin Marston is relevant to this case, since it
mirrors the Defendant's behavior following commission of
the acts that killed Rocky Christensen.
. . .
The
fact that she abused another infant in her care, lied to
others about
it, and that the medical
evidence
establishes that her accidental explanation of that
injury is not consistent with the evidence is compelling
evidence pointing to her being the killer of Rocky
Christensen. She acted with knowledge that what she did
was likely to result in his death and immediately
necessitated a "cover-up" of what really happened.
This theory is improper.

In State v. Featherson, 781 P. 2d 424, 428

(Utah 198 9), the Supreme Court resoundingly rejected a similar ploy
to show that defendant interposed common defenses to prior charges.
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The State also had its medical experts testify to the
significance of evolving or changing explanations as they relate to
making a diagnosis of child abuse.

E.g., R. 1715-6 (v7.56-7) (Dr.

Marion Walker), 1734 (v7.75) (Dr. Walker), R. 1269 (v4.124) (Dr.
Karen Hansen), 1860-1 (v8.68-9) (Dr. Palmer), 2259
(prosecution

emphasizes

this

evidence

in

rebuttal

(closing.100)
portion

of

closing) . This evidence runs afoul of State v. Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d
388 (Utah 1989) (expert witnesses may not comment on truthfulness
of a person's statements on a particular occasion).

The doctors

are commenting directly on the credibility of Ms. Teuscher when she
proffered her explanations.
These errors require reversal.

The evidence here was

almost entirely circumstantial. The State's repeated references to
the

similarity

of

Ms. Teuscher's

"evolving

explanations"

was

devastating to her credibility, and could well have tipped the
scales towards conviction.
POINT II. EVEN IF THE PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE WAS
ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 404(b), IT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN EXCLUDED UNDER RULE 4 03.
In Shickles, 76 0 P. 2d at 2 95, the Supreme Court quoted E.
Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 190, at 565 (3d ed. 1984) for the
factors to be evaluated in the balancing process:
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice
and
the
like
substantially
outweighs
the
incremental probative value, a variety of matters
must be considered, including the strength of the
evidence as to the commission of the other crime,
the similarities between the crimes, the interval
of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative
proof, and the degree to which the evidence
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probably will
hostility.

rouse

the

jury

to

overmastering

Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295; accord Featherson, 781 P.2d at 426;
O'Neil, 848 P. 2d at 701. These factors will be addressed in order.
A.

STRENGTH OF OTHER BAD ACT EVIDENCE.

Obviously, a conviction of a prior crime is the strongest
form of prior bad act evidence.
convictions to rely on.
troubling.

Here, the State had no such

The evidence the State did offer is

With respect to the Austin Marston broken leg incident,

the State's evidence was completely circumstantial.
Dr. Karen Hansen, a member of the child protection team
at Primary Children's Hospital, testified that in her opinion the
broken leg was the result of child abuse, R. 1259 (v4.114), but
later admitted that the broken leg could have resulted from the
child

flipping

changing

table.

out

of Ms. Teuscher's
R.

1277

arms while

(v4.132).

The

on

State

a

diaper

closed

its

investigation of this incident without bringing any charges, and
listed the cause of injury as accidental.
This evidence is weak at best.

R. 1333-4 (v4.188-9).

It is unclear whether this incident

involved any wrongdoing at all, and its not even certain whether
Ms. Teuscher was responsible if there was wrongdoing.

Cases hold

that prior bad acts evidence is inadmissible unless the State can
prove that the defendant was responsible.
at 365

E.g., McGee, 725 S.W.2d

("Because the State was unable to prove clearly that the

appellant committed the extraneous offense, it was improper to
admit evidence concerning it for any purpose.").
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Given the weak nature of the evidence concerning the
broken leg, it should have been excluded.

Its minimal probative

value was clearly outweighed by its prejudice to Ms. Teuscher in
inflaming

the

jury,

confusing

the

issues,

and

presenting

an

improper basis for returning a guilty verdict.
Evidence concerning incidents other than Marston's broken
leg17 was stronger, but that evidence fails on relevancy grounds.
No injury was even shown.

Overall, the evidence presented by the

State to show prior bad acts was not very strong, and should have
been excluded as more prejudicial than probative.
B.

SIMILARITY.

Prior bad acts are admitted more readily when the are
more closely similar to the charged incident.

There is almost no

similarity between the prior bad acts introduced by the State and
the

crime

with which Ms. Teuscher was

charged.

Children

in

closets, hair pulling, baby tossing, a broken leg, and a thumbsover-the-eyes headholding homicide do not at first blush exhibit
any similarity at all.

The only similarity between these acts is

they tend to impugn Ms. Teuscher's character, a forbidden use under
Rule 404(b).
C.

REMOTENESS.

The prior bad acts introduced by the State ranged from 6
months prior to Rocky's death (shaking, hair pulling testified to
by the Wilsons), to just over a year prior (Austin Marston broken
17

E.g., closet incidents, the Wilsons' testimony re: shaking
child, pulling by hair, and lifting over railing, and Ms. Merrill's
testimony re: throwing baby.
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leg), to about 4 years prior (closet episodes [Jody Merrill, Nora
Cook, Det. Jill Candland]; baby tossing episode [Jody Merrill]).
These

occurrences

are

hardly

proximal

to

the

death

of

Rocky

Christensen.
In Featherson, 781 P.2d at 43 0, the Utah Supreme Court
noted that M[t]he relevant inquiry is whether the other acts have
'clearly probative value with respect to the intent of the accused
at the time of

the

offense

charged.'",

quoting United States v.

Scott, 701 F.2d 1340, 1345-46 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S.
856, 104 S.Ct. 175, 78 L.Ed.2d 158 (1983).
In Barnes v. Commonwealth, 794 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Ky. 1990)
the Kentucky Supreme Court noted:
Acts of physical violence, remote in time, prove little
with regard to intent , motive, plan or scheme; have
little relevance other than establishment of a general
disposition to commit such acts; and the prejudice far
outweighs any probative value in such evidence. Taken in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
testimony of Daphne Pritchard did no more than establish
that on two occasions long before the date of the alleged
murder, appellant physically abused his wife.
In Barnes, the prior acts occurred four and seven years prior to
the murder.

Here, the acts were too remote to have any bearing on

appellant's

intent at the time she allegedly lost her impulse

control and shook Rocky to death.

See also State v. Humphrey, 3 81

So. 2d 813, 815 (La. 1980) (abuse of same victim 10 months prior to
charged

instance

inadmissible).

was

too remote

to be

relevant,

and

is

thus

The acts here were too remote to have any bearing

on any material issue, and should have been excluded.
D.

EFFICACY OF ALTERNATE PROOF.
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In Morrell, 803 P. 2d at 296, this court allowed other bad
acts evidence where "no effective alternative proof was available."
Here, the State had all the proof it needed.

Its medical experts

testified that severe shaking occurred, thus eliminating accident
as a possibility if the State's theory is believed by the jury.
previously

stated,

identity

was

not

Teuscher was the only real possibility.

seriously

disputed;

As
Ms.

Finally, intent was not an

element of depraved indifference homicide, so no proof was needed
on this issue.
In Featherson, the Utah Supreme Court noted:
The prosecutorial need for the admitted evidence was
insignificant. There was sufficient evidentiary proof to
show that all the elements of the charged crimes had been
satisfied.
Introduction of all prior misconduct and
convictions was unnecessary.
781 P.2d at 431.
In State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583

(Utah 1984) the Utah

Supreme Court reversed a conviction for motor vehicle theft where
the trial court admitted evidence of a robbery 2 0 minutes prior to
defendant's arrest.

The court found the evidence relevant to show

possession and cooperation between defendant and his companion, but
nevertheless ruled that the evidence should have been excluded as
being more prejudicial than probative.

The court noted:

The inclusion of evidence of the robbery of
Childers twenty minutes before Holder and Perez were
arrested by the highway patrolman was relevant to show
possession of the stolen car and cooperation in that
possession between Perez and Holder. Yet this evidence
was only cumulative on that issue. Possession had been
shown already by the testimony of the arresting highway
patrolman.
Cooperation, or at least leadership in
control of the vehicle by Holder, could be inferred from
Holder's possession of two weapons upon his arrest.
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The merely cumulative character of the robbery
evidence on the element of knowledge and intent regarding
the theft charge is significant because it highlights the
limited value this evidence has when weighed against the
substantial possibility that a jury would be prejudiced
by evidence of Holder's commission of another crime. Such
evidence of the commission of other crimes must be used
with extreme caution because of the prejudicial effect it
may have on the finder of fact. See State v. Kappas, 100
Utah 274, 278, 114 P.2d 205, 207 (1941); State v.
Anderton, 81 Utah 320, 323-24, 17 P.2d 917, 918 (1933);
State v. McGowan, 66 Utah 223, 226-28, 241 P. 314, 315-16
(1925) .
Holder, 694 P. 2d at 584.
similarly cumulative.

Here, the prior bad acts evidence is

The State's medical experts were unrebutted

in their testimony that the shaking was deliberate in nature and
could not be characterized as accidental. Thus, intent and lack of
accident or mistake were already shown.

With respect to identity,

the only other non-children in the home were Ms. Teuscher's high
school age daughters.
Rocky.
Rocky

It was undisputed that they did not touch

See R. 881 (v2.184) (Amy Teuscher, age 18, denies touching
or

seeing

anyone

else

touch

him); 993

(v2.236)

(Kathy

Teuscher denies touching Rocky or seeing anyone else touch him) .
Ms.

Teuscher

testified

was

the

only

other

possibility.

She

that her daughters did not touch Rocky.

(v9.157-8).

likewise
R.

2086-7

To whatever extent the prior bad acts showed identity,

this evidence was merely cumulative and should have been excluded.
For cases from other jurisdictions, see DeVore v. United
States, 368 F.2d 396, 398 and n.4 (9th Cir. 1966) (reversed case,
noting cumulative nature of evidence in case "where the minute peg
of relevancy will be entirely obscured by the dirty linen hung upon
it," quoting State v. Goebel, 218 P.2d 300, 306
31

(Wash. 1950));

McGee, 725 S.W.2d at 364, 365 ("Adequate evidence of appellant's
intent

had

already

circumstantial

been

evidence

introduced.";

"The

of the extraneous

State

offense

introduced
even

though

appellant's identity had already been proven adequately.");
v. Edison, 569 A.2d 657, 668 (Md. 1990) ("in

State

[the trial court's]

judicious determination of the probative effect of the evidence
versus

the

prejudicial

impact,

he

must

weigh

carefully

the

necessity for and probativeness of the evidence concerning the
collateral criminal acts against the untoward prejudice which was
likely to be the consequence of its admission");

Johnson, 544

N.E.2d at 169 ("little, if any, probative value" where intent and
identity not seriously at issue).
The evidence here was unnecessary, and should have been
excluded.
E.

PREJUDICE.

The prejudicial potential of prior bad acts evidence is
so patent it hardly requires explication. As Justice Stewart noted
in his concurrence in State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Utah
1982) :
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal -whether judge or jury -- is to give excessive weight to
the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either
allow it to bear to strongly on the present charge, or to
take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation
irrespective of guilt of the present charge.
Quoting 1 Wigmore on Evidence, § 194 (3rd ed. 1940) at 646.
As stated in State v. Wilson, 513 A.2d 620, 638 (Conn.
1986) :
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Without going into further detail, we may
fairly characterize the evidence as portraying the victim
and her sister as having been abused on numerous
occasions, not always by defendant.
The natural
inclination of any normal juror would be to hold someone
responsible, and the trial court should have taken
special care to minimize the prejudice inherent in this
type of evidence. . . . The trial court clearly abused
its discretion in admitting evidence of injuries, such as
those to the victim's ribs and kidney, in the absence of
any showing that they had been inflicted by the
defendant.").
See also United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 763 (5th
Cir. 1974) ("All that we demand of trial courts and litigants in
this seemingly complex area of criminal jurisprudence is that they
deal

in

reason,

not

categories.

The

treasured

principles

underlying the rule against admitting evidence of other crimes
should be relaxed only when such evidence is genuinely needed and
would be genuinely relevant."; case of defendant John McDuffie
reversed on 404(b) grounds), reversed on other grounds, 425 U.S.
435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976)
Miller);

(only as to defendant

Goodwin, 492 F.2d at 1152 (balanced against the total

absence of need for the evidence of appellant Goodwin's subsequent
conduct to show intent, this case poses a dramatic example of the
kind of prejudice the rule against admitting other-crime evidence
was designed to prevent.").
" [I] f

the

government

can

do

without

such

evidence,

fairness dictates that it should; but if the evidence is essential
to obtain a conviction, it may come in." United States v. Pollock,
926 F.2d 1044, 1048

(11th Cir.), cert, denied.

S.Ct. 593, 116 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991).
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U.S.

, 112

In total, the prior bad acts evidence should have been
excluded.
this

Ms. Teuscher is likely to obtain a better result absent

prejudicial

circumstantial,

evidence.

and

conviction

The

State's

case

on

retrial

is

was

by

no

entirely
means

a

certainty.
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
STATEMENTS
MADE
WITHOUT
BENEFIT
OF
MIRANDA WARNINGS.
Officers

spoke to Ms. Teuscher at her home at about

3:00 p.m. on December 17, 1991.

R. 1152, 1153-4

(v4.7,8-9).

A

short time later, officers requested that Ms. Teuscher go to the
police station for questioning.

R. 1154 (v4.9).

Ms. Teuscher and

her daughters were questioned at the police station that same
evening beginning at about 6:00 p.m.
Ms. Teuscher

of

her

Miranda

Id.

rights.

Officers did not advise
R.

1067-8

(v3.113-4).

Officers also questioned Ms. Teuscher on December 23, 1991 and
January 3, 1992.

R. 1168, 1170 (v4.23,25).

They advised her of

her Miranda rights at each of these sessions.

Id.

Officers

requested that she return to the police station for questioning on
January 6.

R. 1172 (v4.27).

Officers did not advise her of her

Miranda rights at that session.

See Exhibit 21; R. 1068 (v3.114).

The
Fifth
Amendment
to
the
United
States
Constitution guarantees that a defendant shall not be
"compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."
To secure this fundamental right, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), established
procedural
safeguards to be followed in a custodial interrogation. The
prescribed procedures require a warning that the defendant has
the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney
present during questioning. Id. at 444.
State v. Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 17 (Utah 1993) .
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Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides
that "[t]he accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself."
A Miranda warning is required prior to any custodial
interrogation

pursuant

to

the

Fifth

Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
at

17-18.

warnings

Where
prior

to

officers
a

fail

custodial

Amendment

and

Article I,

See Wood, 22 9 Utah Adv. Rep.

to give

the

required

interrogation,

subsequent statements must be suppressed.

an

Miranda

accused's

Wood, 22 9 Utah Adv. Rep.

at 17; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
In State v. Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17-18, the Utah
Supreme Court reaffirmed the four-part test for determining whether
an individual is "in custody" for Miranda purposes which it had set
forth in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983) .
In so doing, the Court clarified that the decision in Carner was
based on Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and that
United States Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Carner had no
impact

on

"in custody"

determinations

under

the

Utah

Constitution.18
In reaffirming Carner, the Utah Supreme Court recognized
that
Subsequent to our decision in Carner, the United States
Supreme Court issued two decisions holding that a
custodial interrogation exists when a suspect is under
18

In Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18, the Court recognized that
it was not required to apply the standards for determining whether
a custodial interrogation occurred which were enunciated in
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983), and Berkemer v.
McCartv, 468 U.S. 420, 441-2 (1984).
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formal arrest or has a reasonable belief that he or she
is in police custody of a type associated with formal
arrest.
Wood, 22 9 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17.
retain

the

focus

on

formality of arrest.

Nevertheless, the Court chose to

individual

circumstances

rather

Id. at 18.

The Court stated:

than

the

Carner recognized that even though a suspect may not be
formally under arrest, he may still be "in custody" for
practical purposes. In essence, Carner emphasizes the
importance of individual circumstance in determining
whether a person is "in custody" for Miranda purposes,
rather than the formality of an arrest that can be
manipulated to circumvent the procedural safeguards of
Miranda.
Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18.
The four Carner factors are:
(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the
investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the
objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the
length and form of interrogation.
Carner, 664 P. 2d at 1171.

The test is an objective one; the

"relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position
would have understood his situation."
at 997.

State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d

In addition to affirming the four-part Carner test, the

Supreme Court noted that "[t]he absence of 'coercive or compulsive
strategy

on

the

officer's

part'

evidences

a

noncustodial

interrogation that 'does not suggest the type of abuse Miranda is
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intended to prevent.'"19

Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17, quoting

State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986).
This Court has applied the four-part earner test and
concluded that the defendant was in custody on many occasions.
See,

e.g.,

State v.

Mirquet,

844

P.2d

at

997-1001;

State v.

Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1105-07 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 817
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) , cert, denied,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117

L.Ed.2d 507 (1992); State v. Snvder, 860 P.2d 351, 357 (Utah App.
1993) .
In the present case, officers questioned Ms. Teuscher on
December 17, 1991 and January 6, 1992 without advising her of her
"Miranda" rights.

Both interviews occurred at the police station

after officers had requested that Ms. Teuscher go to the station
for questioning.

R.

1154, 1172

(v4.9,27).

Because

she was

subjected to custodial interrogation without being advised of her
Miranda

rights,

statements

made

by

interrogation should have been suppressed.

Ms. Teuscher

at

each

See Miranda, 3 84 U.S.

at 444; Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17.
A.

OFFICERS
SUBJECTED
MS. TEUSCHER
TO
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION ON DECEMBER 17.

A review of the earner factors demonstrates that officers
subjected Ms. Teuscher to custodial interrogation on December 17.
19

The Supreme Court recognized that in State v. Sampson, 808
P.2d 1100, 1105 (Utah App. 1991), this Court added a fifth factor-"'whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely
and willingly.711
Wood, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26 n.3, quoting
Sampson, 808 P. 2d at 1105. The Supreme Court pointed out, however,
that this "fifth factor" falls within the objective indicia of
arrest and therefore is not truly an additional factor." Wood, 229
Utah Adv. Rep. at 26 n.3.
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The

first

interrogation.

Carner

In

the

factor

present

focuses
case,

on the

officers

site

of

the

interrogated

Ms. Teuscher at the police station after interviewing her at her
home

earlier

in

the

day.

R.

1152,

1154

(v4.7,9).

While

questioning at the police station "lends itself to a finding of
custody", "that fact alone is not conclusive."
at 1105.

In this case, earlier in the day officers had gone to

Ms. Teuscher's
requested

Sampson, 808 P.2d

home

to

talk

she

go

to

that

circumstances,

where

three

to
the

her,

then

police

hours

after

telephoned

station.
officers

her

Under

and
such

talked

to

Ms. Teuscher at her home, they were again interrogating her at the
police station, the site of the interrogation weighs heavily for a
determination of custody.
The second factor, whether the investigation focused on
Ms. Teuscher,

also

weighs

in

favor

of

an

"in custody"

determination.

At the time of the questioning, officers knew that

the child had died while in the "sole custody" of Ms, Teuscher.
1164 (v4.19).

R.

Detective Candland also knew that the referral on

the case had come from Primary Children's Medical Center and that
" [t]here was some concern because this was the second death at the
daycare center."

R. 1150-51 (v4.5-6).

After talking with Jerri at

her home, and before the 6:00 p.m. interview at the police station,
Detective Candland talked to the medical examiner, a detective
investigating the broken leg incident and possibly the detective
who had investigated the previous death at the center, and Joanna
Murphy from Social Services. R. 1154 (v4.9) . In addition, she was
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present at the autopsy and learned "that there was a pooling of the
blood at the base of the brain" for which the medical examiner had
no explanation.

R. 1155 (v4.10).

Detective Candland also apparently knew that the injury
"most likely resulted from some sort of trauma that didn't appear
to be natural," that the hospital "considered this suspicious,"
that someone at the hospital had a conversation with Ms. Teuscher
which

apparently

raised

his

or

her

suspicions,

and

that

Ms. Teuscher "had been reported for child neglect, cruelty to a
child, and suspicious

death and then this incident."

R. 1156

(v4.ll) .20
Although Detective Candland claimed that Ms. Teuscher was
just

a

witness,

information

about

she

"believed

[the

that

circumstances

Ms. Teuscher
and

cause

had

unique

of

Rocky

Christensen's death] because the child was in her sole custody
during that day."

R. 1164 (v4.19).

The detective also believed

that the death was accidental, unintentional or a bizarre natural
trauma.

R. 1165 (v4.20).
As was the case in Sampson, " [n] othing in the record

suggests other suspects were sought or questioned, or other leads
pursued" before the December 17 interrogation.
P. 2d at 1105.

See Sampson, 808

In the present case, although the officers may have

not been absolutely certain what, if any crime had occurred, they
were conducting an investigation into the child's death and had
20

Detective Candland acknowledged that she had testified at the
preliminary hearing that she was aware of this information prior to
the December 17 questioning. R. 1156 (v4.11).
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focused

that

investigation

on

Ms. Teuscher.

R.

1156,

1164

(v4.11,19) . This is similar to the circumstances in Sampson where
the officers had

focused

their investigation on Sampson, even

though they did not know what, if any, crime had occurred when they
questioned him.
Because

officers

had

focused

their

investigation

on

Ms. Teuscher, the second factor weighs in favor of a conclusion
that she was in custody.
The third factor, whether objective indicia of arrest
were

present,

also

tips

in

Ms. Teuscher was in custody.

favor

of

a

determination

that

In Mirguet, 844 P. 2d at 999, this

Court recognized that "readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn
guns" are not the only indicia of arrest and that being "isolated
in a patrol vehicle with an officer accusing [one] of a crime" also
might indicate that an individual is in custody.

In addition,

"whether a defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and
willingly" "falls within the objective indicia of arrest."

Wood,

229 Utah Adv. Rep. at 2 6 n.3.
In the present case, officers "requested" by phone less
than

three

hours

after

talking

with

her

at

her

home

that

Ms. Teuscher go to the police station for further questioning.
Although

the

record

offers

little

information

as

to

whether

Ms. Teuscher went to the police station "freely and willingly," it
demonstrates that she went there only at the direction of the
officers.

Although the officers allowed Ms. Teuscher to leave at

the conclusion of the interview, while she was in the interrogation
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room, she was isolated from others and controlled by the officers.
While this factor does not weigh as strongly for a determination
that Ms. Teuscher was in custody as the first two factors, it
nevertheless supports that conclusion.
Finally, the fourth factor, the length and form of the
investigation, provides little support in determining the custody
issue.

While the questioning was not unduly long, it focused on

Ms. Teuscher as the only person having custody of the baby when he
died.

Under

the

totality

circumstances, Ms. Teuscher

to

session.

Failure to advise Ms. Teuscher of her Miranda rights

to questioning

interrogation

requires

that

during

her

the

was

subjected

prior

custodial

of

statements

December 17

during

the

December 17 evening interview be suppressed.
B.

THE OFFICERS SUBJECTED MS. TEUSCHER TO
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION WITHOUT ADVISING
HER OF HER MIRANDA RIGHTS ON JANUARY 6,
1992.

A review of the earner factors as they relate to the
January 6, 1992 interrogation demonstrates that under the totality
of circumstances, officers subjected Ms. Teuscher to custodial
interrogation at that time.
The first factor, the site of the interrogation, weighs
in favor of a determination of custody.

See Sampson, 808 P.2d at

1105; see also discussion supra at 38.

Ms. Teuscher had gone to

the

police

station

January 3, 1992.

for

questioning

on

December 23,

R. 1168, 1169, 1170 (v4.23,24,25).

1991

and

At each of

those interrogations, officers advised Ms. Teuscher of her Miranda
rights.

Id.

At

the

January 3
41

interrogation,

officers

told

Ms. Teuscher that there had to be an explanation for the baby's
death, and that Ms. Teuscher's explanation that the baby hit his
head when dropped was not consistent with his injuries.
(v4.26-7).

R. 1171-2

The January 3 interview concluded with arrangements

being made for Ms. Teuscher to return to the police station on
January 6 to record what she said and demonstrated on January 3.
R. 1172, 1174

(v4.27,29).

Under these circumstances, where she

returned to the police station at the insistence of the officers
after having been told that her statement was not making sense in
terms of the baby's injuries, the site of the interrogation

weighs

in favor of a custody determination.
The second factor, whether the investigation focused on
Ms. Teuscher,

also

determination.

In

weighs

in

addition

to

favor
the

of

an

"in custody"

information

known

on

December 17, by January 6, officers had concluded that Ms. Teuscher
had caused the baby's death, either accidentally or intentionally.
R. 1165 (v4.20).

Officers also knew that Ms. Teuscher had given

different explanations for the injuries, and that at least one of
those explanations was not consistent with the type of
sustained by the baby.

R. 1171 (v4.26)

injury

The investigation focused

on Ms. Teuscher by January 6.
The third factor, whether objective indicia of arrest
were

present,

also

lends

Ms. Teuscher was in custody.

itself

to

a

determination

that

She went to the police station at the

insistence of officers only three days after the third interview by
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officers.

R. 1171-2 (v4.26-7).

Although officers did not escort

her to the station, they clearly expected her to go there.

Id.

Finally, the fourth factor, the length and form of the
investigation,

also

lends

itself

Ms. Teuscher was in custody.

to

a

determination

that

The January 6 interrogation was

longer and the questioning more intense than the December 17
session.

The officers had confronted Ms. Teuscher on January 3

with the fact that "something had happened to Rocky Christensen"
and that Rocky's injury "wasn't consistent with her story."
1179

(v4.34).

R.

The officers had also told Teuscher that Rocky

hitting his head on the rocking chair was not consistent with his
injury. Id. According to the officers, Ms. Teuscher then "finally
admit[ted] that around 9:30/10:00 that she had dropped the baby.
Id.

Officers then told Teuscher to return on January 6 to record

her demonstration of how she dropped the baby.

R. 1172 (v4.27).

On January 6, the officer told Teuscher that they were
videotaping her demonstration and would show it to the medical
examiner and prosecutors to determine whether dropping the child
was a possible cause of death.

R. 1175 (v4.30).

Under these

circumstances, the questioning had shifted from investigatory to
accusatory,

demonstrating

the

custodial

nature

of

this

interrogation.
Under the totality of circumstances, Ms. Teuscher was
subjected to custodial interrogation on January 6. Her statements
taken without being advised of her Miranda rights should not have
been admitted.

Wood, 22 9 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18.
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C.
The

ADMISSION OF THE STATEMENTS REQUIRES A
NEW TRIAL.

traditional

rule

as to admissibility

of

coerced

confessions was that it is
axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived
of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in
whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without
regard for the truth or falsity of the confession, Rogers
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760,
and even though there is ample evidence aside from the
confession to support the conviction. Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S. Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029; Stroble
v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 72 S.Ct. 599, 96 L.Ed. 872;
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d
975.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S.Ct. 1774,

, 12 L.Ed.2d

908, 915 (1964).
In Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S.
113 L.Ed.2d

, 111 S.Ct. 1246,

302, reh. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2067, 114 L.Ed.2d

472

(1991), the Supreme Court retreated from this established rule of
law and held, with four justices dissenting, that admission of
coerced statements is subject to a harmless error analysis.
,

113

L.Ed.2d

at

329-33

(per Rehnquist,

C.

J.,

Id. at

joined

by

O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Scalia).
As
statements

a

result

of

is now subject

federal law.

Fulminante,
to a harmless

admission
error

of

coerced

analysis

under

Ms. Teuscher's statements were inadmissible, and

should have been suppressed.
was prejudicial.

Failure to suppress her statements

Ms. Teuscher is entitled to a new trial.

Because a federal constitutional right is implicated, as
a matter of federal law Ms. Teuscher is entitled to a new trial
unless the State shows the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
44

doubt.

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824,

,

17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11, reh. denied, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17
L.Ed.2d

705

(1967)

(requiring

"beneficiary of a constitutional

error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained");

State v. Velarde,

734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1986) (citing Chapman).
The State used the statements of Ms. Teuscher primarily
to

demonstrate

how

her

story

had

changed

or

evolved.

This

dovetailed into the State's theory that the "cover-ups" for the
Marston broken leg and the Rocky Christensen fatality are identical
and show intent, lack of accident or mistake, and identity.

As

explained in Point I.A.4, supra at 25, this argument is improper
under Featherson.

The admission of Ms. Teuscher's

statements

compounds this error and exacerbates the prejudice to appellant.
As a matter of state constitutional

law, this Court

should hold that there can be no harmless error when a statement
obtained in violation of the accused's rights under Miranda is
admitted at trial.
Until Fulminante was decided in 1991, introduction of
involuntary or coerced statements into evidence necessitated that
the defendant be given a new trial.
White's

Section

III dissenting

opinion

21

As expressed

in Justice

in Fulminante21 at

113

Each of the four sections of the Court's opinion contained
a different majority.
White (joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens) wrote the opinion of the Court
in Sections I
(introduction), II (confession was coerced), and IV (facts don't
show harmless error), and a dissent in Section III (harmless error
analysis should be inapplicable to coerced confessions). Rehnguist
(joined by O'Connor) wrote a dissent in Sections I (confession not
45

L.Ed.2d at 317-22, the adoption of the harmless error doctrine to
erroneously admitted coerced confessions is contrary to established
United States Supreme Court precedent.

When the Supreme Court

first declared that constitutional error may be subject to harmless
error analysis in Chapman v. California, it expressly noted:
our prior cases have indicated that there are some
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error,8
8

See, e.g. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct.
844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (coerced confession); ...
Id. at 23 and n.8, 87 S.Ct. at
n.8.

and n.8, 17 L.Ed.2d at 710 and

Supreme Court cases since Chapman have been to the same

effect.

See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483, 92 S.Ct. 619,

,

30 L.Ed.2d 618, 624 (1972); Mincev v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398,
98 S.Ct. 2408,

, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 303-4

(1978); New Jersey v.

Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459, 99 S.Ct. 1292,

, 59 L.Ed.2d 501, 510

(1979); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 n.6, 106 S.Ct. 3101,

,

92 L.Ed.2d 460, 470 n.6 (1986).
Prior to the decision in Fulminante, the Utah Court of
Appeals implicitly recognized that improper admission of coerced
statements is not subject to harmless error analysis.

In Sampson,

the Court of Appeals stated "'[t]he fifth amendment exclusionary
rule

is clearly dictated by the Constitution

and

is the only

possible means of protecting the values underlying the privilege
coerced) and III (facts show harmless error), and the opinion of
the Court in Section II (harmless error analysis applicable to
admission of coerced confessions) . Scalia joined in Sections I and
II of White's opinion, and Sections II and III of Rehnquist's.
Kennedy joined in Sections I and IV of White's opinion. Kennedy
and Souter joined in Sections I and II of Rehnquist's opinion.
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against self-incrimination."

Id. at 1112 (quoting M. Gardner, The

Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule -- A Critique, 3 5
Hastings L.J. 429, 466 (1984)).
Even if the United States Supreme Court has retreated
from this position, Utah's constitution requires no less.
history

clearly

indicates

that

the

drafters

of

Utah's

the

Utah

Constitution would have found the Supreme Court's departure in
Fulminante

from

constitutional

a

per

history

se

rule

"differs

to

be

somewhat

abhorrent.
from

Utah's

the history

and

experience of her sister states . . . [and] must be weighed in light
of Utah's unusual history and experience with the statehood process
and

with

the

government."

process

of

drafting

a

fundamental

charter

of

Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government -- The

History of Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, 314.
During the drafting of Utah's constitution, the state
legislators were mindful of the persecution just endured by the
Mormon people.
Seizure
Section

See Wallentine, Heeding the Call:

Jurisprudence
14,

17

Utah

Under
J.

Search and

the Utah Constitution, Article
Contemp.

L.

267

(1991)

I,

(Utah's

constitutional drafters included men who had practiced polygamy).
The majority of present state constitutions were drafted
in . . . an era of popular mistrust and hostility toward
government.
The people's mistrust of government is
readily apparent on the face of many state constitutions.
Utah's constitution, drafted in 1895, is representative
of the era . . .
Flynn,

Federalism

and Viable

State Government--The

Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, 314.

History

of

The harmless

error analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in Fulminante would
47

have been repulsive to the framers of Utah's constitution.

Despite

their recent renunciation of polygamy in exchange for statehood,
sympathetic

Utah

legislators would not

have

tolerated

confessions being used against suspects at trial.
admission

of

coerced

Regardless

of

the

statements

current

could

standard

Such erroneous

never

under

coerced

be

federal

harmless.

law,

Utah's

constitution demands that Ms. Teuscher be granted a new trial.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
ADMONISH THE JURORS NOT TO FORM OR EXPRESS AN
OPINION UNTIL THE CASE IS SUBMITTED TO THEM.
Rule

17 (j) of

the Utah

Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure

provides:
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the
jurors are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they
shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or
suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other person on
the subject of the trial, and that it is their duty not
to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is
finally submitted to them.
Emphasis added.
During recesses, the jury was admonished not to discuss
the case amongst themselves or with others.

However, the jury was

never instructed to keep an open mind and not form or express an
opinion.

See. R. 689-90 (vl.248-9), 733 (v2.35), 803 (v2.106), 866

(V2.169), 927 (v2.230), 947A (v2.251), 1019 (v3.64), 1059 (v3.105),
1069 (V3.115), 1093 (v3.139), 1128-9 (v3.174-5), 1144-5 (v3.190-1),
1306

(v4.161),

1371

(v4.227)

(no

admonishment

at

all), 1423

(V4.280), 1453 (v5.30), 1496 (v5.74), 1551 (v5.130), 1616 (v5.196),
1658-1660

(V6.41-3), 1701

(v7.41), 1791
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(v7.132), 1849

(v8.57),

1928

(v8.137), 1984

(v9.54), 2010

(v9.80), 2061

(v9.132), 2114

(v9.185), 2155 (V9.227), and 2189 (closing.29).
This trial lasted eight days, Feb. 8-12 and 16-18, and
included

a three day weekend.

approximately
(v8.128).22

5:00

P.M.

The State did not rest

on Wednesday,

February

17.

R.

until
1919

Ms. Teuscher had no meaningful opportunity to present

her case until Thursday, February 18, 10 days after the trial
started.

Failure to admonish the jury not to form an opinion gave

the jury ten days to mull over the State's evidence, and form
opinions based on that evidence, without any opportunity for the
defense to tell its side of the story.

Under the circumstances,

Ms. Teuscher's due process right to the presumption of innocence
has been impaired, if not vitiated.

Ms. Teuscher should be granted

a new trial.
POINT V.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRES THAT
MS. TEUSCHER BE GIVEN A NEW TRIAL.
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two prong test
for reversals for improper statements of counsel:
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case
is, did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in considering
in determining their verdict, and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced
by those remarks.
Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426.
The prosecution introduced evidence that Rocky's arrest
occurred on his parents anniversary.
22

R. 653 (vl.213), 7i

2 (v2.2-

The defense called one "five minute" witness, which took
eight transcript pages, and the proceedings adjourned at 5:25 P.M.
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3).

This information is probative of no material fact and serves

only to inflame the jury.

The prosecution asked Ms. Teuscher to

comment on the veracity of two witnesses for the prosecution.
2096-7 (v9.167-8), 2098 (v9.169).

R.

This violates State v. Emmett,

839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992) and State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339,
343-4 (Utah App. 1993), cert. denied No. 930427 (Utah December 1,
1993).

In closing

argument, the prosecution

argued

that Ms.

Teuscher should be convicted out of considerations for the victim.
This violates, e.g., McCartv v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Okla.
Crim.App. 1988) .
The errors here are plain.

The jurors attention was

drawn to matters they are not justified in considering.
errors should have been obvious to the trial court.

These

These errors

also affect the substantial rights of Ms. Teuscher, and were highly
prejudicial to here.
made

the

jury

Appeals to sympathy for the victim likely

lean

more

strongly

towards

holding

someone

responsible, even if the case had not been adequately proved.
Asking Ms. Teuscher to comment on the veracity of other witnesses
did irreparable injury to her credibility, and may well have tipped
the scales in this very circumstantial case.

Ms. Teuscher should

be granted a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Teuscher's
should be reversed.
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ADDENDUM A

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
Rule 4 04 (b) , Utah Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent
part:
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without
just
compensation.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.

